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THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE

THE POLITICAL EVOL UTION OF
INTELLIGENCE

instruction to Moses to send men into Canaan in order to learn what
riches the land offered and what enemy forces would be encountered in
Canaan. Their assignment was the most basic of the intelligence tasks simple reconnaissance, a report of what was seen and no more.

BY STEPHEN BOWERS
THE SOPHISTICATION OF INTELLIGENCE

While recent attention has been focused on the sensational aspects of
intelligence work, it is the mundane uses of intelligence which have
most increased in importance. A broader conception of politics,
coupled with an application of technologically advanced military
equipment, the expanding role of high technology industries, and
improved methods to obtain intelligence data have all contributed to
an enlarged role for intelligence. To understand the significance of the
contemporary role of intelligence, one must trace the development of
the art.
Intelligence dates back to the beginning of mankind. Primitive man
sought answers to questions relating to his survival and comfort. He
wanted to know what his enemies were doing and how their threats
could be met. Where could he find food and shelter? With his limited
understanding of the world around him, these matters strained the
limits of his knowledge. As society developed, there was a division of
responsibilities and the appointment of intelligence 'officers'. Yet these
first intelligence operatives lacked even the most rudimentary technical
sophistication and, as often as not, turned for assistance to mysticists
who presumably had gifts enabling them to 'see' into the future and so
help heads of state.
The systematisation of mysticism occurred in China around 1200
BC with the appearance of The Book Of Changes or, as it is also called,
I Ching. This work, a collection of mystical, cabbalistic teachings,
served for centuries as an instructional guide for spies. While offering
no direct answers, it was believed to provide, with the appropriate
ritualistic incantations, important clues which the decision-maker could
decipher. 1
Early Greek intelligence likewise relied upon the supernatural.
According to mythology, Cassandra, the daughter of Priam of Troy,
received the gift of prophecy from the god Apollo with instructions
that she use it to help her people. The Greeks assumed that the gods
themselves provided intelligence - frequently in the form of riddles to assist in the formulation of political or military strategy. Yet, whiL:
the warnings of the Delphic oracle eventually became less supernatural,
they continued to be painfully unscientific and unreliable.
Biblical records note the application of intelligence to political and
military problems of the time. For example, Numbers recounts God's

In 480 BC the Emperor Xerxes captured three Greek agents sent to
spy on his troops. Xerxes ordered that the three be allowed to view his
impressive array of forces and then return to the Greek army. His plan,
obviously, was to deter his enemies from attacking by convincing them
of his invincibility. Contemporary practices of allowing some espionage
against one's forces are a reflection of this early psychological ploy.
Unfortunately, this gamble did not work for Xerxes but simply enabled
the Greeks to be better prepared for Xerxes' large force. The transition
from simple reconnaissance to modern intelligence was also aided by
Xerxes' attempts to analyse the behaviour of Greek soldiers in order to
detect exploitable weaknesses. This is the first recorded instance of the
employment of analysts to explain foreign behaviour. 2
The continued subordination of intelligence to military needs as
well as the increasing sophistication and glorification of intelligence
work is illustrated by the writings of Sun Tzu, a contemporary of
Confucius and author of Principles Of War. Sun Tzu provides the first
recorded effort to examine the intelligence process systematically and
intellectually while developing principles and systems of espionage. He
offered lessons on the functions and techniques of these systems,
institutions primarily of the East, the region in which the spy's mission
and importance were first recognised. Leaders of the different Chinese
kingdoms, Sun Tzu explained, emphasised the necessary association of
intelligence with military endeavours and stimulated its advancement
far beyond simple reconnaissance. Deception had become a hallmark of
intelligence as spies wearing enemy uniforms infiltrated adversary's
camps. Exposed agents were allowed to continue their missions while
authorities provided them with misleading information. Sun Tzu
suggested that an even better course would be to win the allegiance of
captured spies by generous treatment and then dispatch them back to
their former masters as conscious agents of a new master. Sun Tzu
wrote that the spy should enjoy a privileged position. No honour, he
insisted, was too great for these heroic figures, a sharp contrast to the
prevailing modern Western view of spies as contemptible individuals
whose existence should, if possible, be denied. He also delineated categories of spies and gave detailed instructions on the employment of
each. In view of the value of espionage in defending the nation against
war and in waging war economically if it came, Sun Tzu called for a
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permanent espionage service to tell leaders about all foreign developments. 3
INCREASED DEMANDS ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The changing conditions of military campaigns led to increased
demands on intelligence operatives. Knowledge of languages, dialects,
and customs became vital to the success of intelligence. Master strategists such as Hannibal recognised this through bitter experience, such as
his unfortunate campaign in southern Italy where he instructed his
guides to take him to Casinum. Hannibal's poor command of the
guides' language resulted in a misunderstanding and they took him to
Casilinun instead of Casinum resulting in near disaster. Mithridates, on
the other hand, was a master of twenty-two languages and always
understood local tribes and their customs. His thorough training
enabled him to enjoy great success in his rivalries with the Romans. The
Romans long suffered from a self-imposed handicap in that espionage
was originally rejected by their leadership. Both Tiberius and Julius
Caesar opposed the establishment of a secret service: the existence of
,
..
4
one might have prevented Caesar s assassmatlon.
Failure to understand the culture and customs of the East led to
mistakes by European leaders during the Middle Ages. They knew little
of the Byzantine Empire, the Eastern Slavs, or the Muslim peoples.
Efforts to make contacts with these civilisations were branded as
'heresy'.
POLITICAL ADAPTATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

The next phase in the evolution of intelligence saw commercial
activities used for espionage with an increasingly political overtone.
European ignorance of the East was reduced by commercial ventures in
that region. European political leaders, however, did not immediately
utilise the knowledge placed at their disposal by ambitious merchants.
It was not until the fifteenth century that the Italians realised the folly
of isolating political intelligence operatives from commercial operatives
and established embassies and missions in foreign states, a new practice
..
5
soon adopted by other European ImItators.
By the time of the Hundred Years' War, espionage was having a
maj or impact on political and military affairs. The English, unable to
defeat the French forces inspired by Joan of Arc placed a covert agent
among the French clergy who organised a plot which eventually led to
the death of Joan of Arc. This significant event illustrated the link
between information and action and also demonstrated the application
6
of politically based intelligence.
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THE DOMESTIC FUNCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

With the application of intelligence to political concerns of an
international character came intelligence systems for maintenance of
domestic political control. If it was important to know what a foreign
adversary was planning, it was equally vital to know about one's
domestic rivals. By 1600, the Japanese Shogun Yeyasu had established
a domestic espionage network to watch provincial governors. This
system operated through Y eyasu's personal followers who commanded
spies positioned throughout the nation. Even more extensive was the
earlier Chinese family spy system of the tenth century AD by the
emperor's Privy Councillor, Wang An-shih. At the time, the country was
plagued by banditry and Wang decided that only a comprehensive spy
system could help. Under his system, families were organised into units
of ten, fifty, and five hundred with all family members responsible for
the crimes committed by other members or relatives and guests visiting
in their homes. Citizens were required to report on good as well as evil
deeds. Wang's family spy system became a model for future regimes,
including that of Mao Tse-Tung. 7
Intelligence had expanded beyond 'battlefield' intelligence, linking
information with action, developing political intelligence and organising
domestic security. Application of intelligence to state service was the
most significant step, however, in establishing specific, identifiable
users of intelligence with overt political interests and requirements.
The Egyptians and the Italians did much to develop the practice but
the contributions of Sir Francis Walsingham and Joseph Fouche were
vital. Walsingham established the first modern political espionage
system that gave open service to the state. The political spy system
which he set up for Queen Elizabeth I employed almost every
technique of espionage: his organisation combined the domestic and
the international. It dispatched students from Cambridge University
in an effort to penetrate the French court; the plot involved the poet
and dramatist Christopher Marlowe whose mysterious death some
believe was connected with this undertaking. Walsingham's system is
credited with defeating the French-backed conspiracy to elevate Mary
Queen of Scots to the English throne and procuring the naval intelligence that enabled England to destroy the Spanish Armada. 8
Joseph Fouche organised Napoleon's secret political police and
counterespionage machinery. Unlike Walsingham two hundred years
earlier, Fouche was not involved in the collection of military and
foreign intelligence. The primarily domestic political concern of the
French organisation continued even after Fouche's departure. By this
time, recognition of the importance of intelligence had led most
European nations to develop improved intelligence operations. Sweden
171
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and Holland became the premier examples of small states which
enjoyed prominence because of outstanding intelligence systems.
The Swedes used religious connections to recruit foreign nationals for
Swedish espionage. Such religious recruitment was a precursor of
9
Soviet ideological recruitment in the name of Marxism-Leninism.

resources and efforts.
Pearl Harbour did the most to stimulate American efforts to
establish an effective intelligence system. In early 1942 there was
recrimination and hints of espionage which led Congress to mount an

investigation to fix responsibility. It became evident that documents
had crossed the desks of many US officials. Many of them with proper
analysis, would have indicated the strong likelihood of a Japanese
attack. Congressional summaries declared that it was not treason or
ineptitude but the lack of a coordinated system for gathering and
evaluating information on Japanese military, political, social, and
economic developments that made the disaster at Pearl Harbour
possible. This set the stage for the creation of a centralised intelligence
agency to replace the various departmental operations.
A problem during the early years of the war was the almost
complete absence of cooperation between the British and American
intelligence agencies. The job of establishing an unofficial relationship
between British and American services fell to Canadian businessman
William Stephenson. His travels as a businessman convinced him tha~
the Germans were building an armaments industry that would threaten
Britain, a view rejected by most in the British government. Recognising
Stephenson's skill and perception before the war, Winston Churchill
turned to Stephenson after the war began, asking the Canadian not only
to conduct propaganda for the British in the United States, but also to
work out an arrangement with the Americans for intelligence sharing.
As a result of his success in approaching the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover
designated Stephenson as 'Head of British Security Co-ordination' and
supported measures for sharing intelligence efforts. 14
War had stimulated the advance of British cryptanalysis as dozens
of mathematicians, lawyers, chess players, and historians joined forces
to break the German wartime 'Enigma' code. The breaking of codes
produced by 'Enigma', the German encyphering machine, was the
responsibility of this varied group of individuals known as 'Ultra'.
Having broken the German code, the Ultra group intercepted Nazi
wireless traffic as it was dispatched and read it as quickly as those for
whom it was intended. As a result, Allied commanders had remarkable
insight into enemy dispositions and plans. In one case (later well
publicised), Ultra actually read a German directive before it was read by
General Rommel, to whom it was addressed. 1s
The development of intelligence continued in the post-war years and
led to the creation of the US Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA's
broadened concerns, political, military, social, and economic, to name
the most notable ones, carried this organisation beyond the earlier
OSS which was subordinated to the J oint Chiefs of Staff. The CIA
mandate was oriented toward a general political assignment and thus
represented an important step in the political evolution of intelligence
during this period. 16
Such advances did not always mean greater effectiveness, either in
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INTELLIGENCE IN SERVICE TO THE STATE

The art of intelligence was to advance rapidly under state tutelage.
Intelligence technology benefitted from generous state funding; legal
support made possible the application of new information-gathering
devices and the recruitment of the best personnel. State interests
demanded the extensive development of counter-intelligence or
counter-espionage. Britain's passage of the Official Secrets Act of 1889
was the first significant legal expression of the need to make systematic
efforts to protect the information of the state. This law was not only
the product of Victorian military devices, but also came about as a
result of numerous scandals in England in 1888 involving officials who,
for various reasons, shared information with foreign military representatives. The development of weaponry by private interests made supervision of security difficult and the Official Secrets Act was an
' s secrets. 10
h
important effort to protect testate
The Act helped resolve long controversies about what could and
could not be properly disclosed or shared by making criminal the communication of any defence information to foreign representatives.
Additional legislation dealt with giving secret information to newspapers. A more stringent Secrets Act was passed in 1911 in response to
widespread concerns about the success German agents were allegedly
enj oying. Open foreign efforts to recruit individuals who had worked
on classified British military projects - such as the placing of advertisements in newspaper by agencies of the US government - underlined the
need to do more to protect British security.
INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR TWO

It was not until nearly the middle of the Second World War that the
United States joined the British in development of a coherent system
for production of systematic intelligence. The creation of the Office of
. we 11 k nown. 12 It was now t h at t h e SOVlet
. U'
Strategic Services IS
1110n
improved its intelligence to a point so their operations were comparable
to those of the British and the Americans in terms of the committed
13
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satisfying new political demands or in accomplishing military objectives. American experiences in Korea highlighted the problem. The CIA
failure to assess Chinese intentions in Korea lead to what is generally
viewed as the major political mistake of the war. Faulty estima.tes of
North Korean arrangements for the defence of Seoul - mtelligence
estimates were off by 100% - threatened the prospects for the success
of the Inchon campaign. 17 However the fact is that Korea p:es.ented
Western forces with an opportunity to develop more sophisticated
methods for digesting and sifting enormous amounts of intellige~ce
.
d at a. The war in Vietnam added still more to the science of collecting
both political and military data. under combat conditions. The mam
effort was put into the American Phoenix programme. ~t~ough often
denounced as a simple 'assassination programme', PhoeniX mvolved the
establishment of District Intelligence Operations Centers in about twothirds of the country's 240 districts and in almost all of Vietnam's :-4
rovinces. The objective of Phoenix was to identify CommUnist
P
military and political leaders so as to neutrarlse t h"
elr m fl uence ..18
While the reorientation of intelligence objectives was takmg place,
there was also another dramatic change in intelligence technologies.
Computers, reconnaissance satellites, and even more 'space-age' inn~
vations have now allowed machines to replace agents on the ground m
many cases. 19 The advance of technology enabled the intelligence
operative to find new uses for his product. Global surveillance means
that the earth's natural resources themselves can now be the target of
the spy's attentions. Not surprisingly, many intellig~nce functions have
been converted to commercial uses just as commercial endeavours once
aided the development of intelligence activities.
THE SOVIET EXAMPLE: COMBINED OBJECTIVES

The best example of a reorientation of intelligence objectives is the
Soviet intelligence system, known as the KGB. It. combines domes~ic
and international functions with the ability to Unite mtelhgence with
action. In the broadest sense, the KGB is responsible for monitoring
the daily lives of Soviet citizens and preventing 'anti-Soviet provocations'. This task is done by the Second Chief Directorate, a force .of
several hundred thousand men and women who run the most effective
control system of any modern industrial state and perform an inva~u
able political service in helping the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union maintain power. In addition to this force, there IS a supplementary informer network which at one time num~ere.d ~ver five million
unpaid volunteers. This mammoth system made it difficult f~r Western
intelligence services to place agents on the ground - the United States
only early warning device against a possible Soviet attack - before the
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start of U-2 flights and satellite surveillance.2°
For the KGB, defence of the homeland does not stop at the USSR's
frontiers. The KGB's First Chief Directorate enables the Kremlin to
reach beyond Soviet borders to frustrate incipient movements by
cmigre groups hoping to penetrate the CPSU's empire. The 'Trust
Operation' of the 1920's demonstrated Soviet capabilities as the
Kremlin sometimes deceived both British and French intelligence while
blunting the political threat of the million-strong anti-Soviet emigration
in the West. After World War Two, Soviet concern for former citizens
was reflected in the forced repatriation of Soviet nationals left in
occupied Germany, the KGB's infiltration of the anti-Soviet 'People's
Labour League' and the large Ukrainian emigration, and the physical
liquidation of numerous leaders of the Soviet emigration and defectors
from official USSR services. Although the KGB's Laboratory of Special
Weapons has devoted considerable energy to the development of the
'perfect' murder weapon, the West German trial of Bogdan Stashinsky
in 1962, with its worldwide, sensational reports, and the interests of the
USSR's image during the years of detente have discouraged direct
Soviet involvement in so-called 'wet affairs'.2l
While violent measures against emigres make exciting reading, the
KGB's political activities had a more significant impact on the international balance of power. Efforts to utilise espionage and covert
operations to create distrust among the Western allies have illustrated
the political utility of the KGB. Much has been written about the career
of Kim Philby and the operations he directly compromised. Yet, the
secrets betrayed by Philby also contributed to a loss of mutual confidence by the Western allies. The 1974 case of the GDR agent Guenter
Guillaume, one of Chancellor Brandt's closest aides, added to this loss
of trust. The KGB also recruits 'agents of influence', people who serve
the USSR not by revealing Western secrets but by supporting Soviet
positions in a public forum. In recent years the Soviet embassy in
Washington has become active in lobbying Congress by presenting the
Soviet position on legislative proposals relating to foreign affairs. The
Soviet techniques are no different from those of countless domestic
'pressure groups'. Journalists, businessmen, lawyers, and numerous
professionals can serve as 'agents of influence'.
Soviet political objectives are also advanced by the deployment of
Soviet intelligence forces against Western firms dealing in technologies
that are of military significance. Soviet success in acquiring Western
technology can be attributed to a blending of legal purchases and illegal
acquisitions. These efforts are directed by several thousand technology
collection officers working in Western nations. Open literature, legal
trade channels, and scientific conferences are the most common legal
175
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avenues utilised by the Soviets and their allies. Illegal methods involve
everything from outright theft to the establishment of firms which pass
technology directly from the West to Eastern Europe. Over twenty
firms set up by Soviet and East European agencies operate in the
United States for this purpose and over 300 similar firms operate in
Western Europe and Canada. Where they have not set up their own
firms, Soviet frequently use agents-in-place who will divert important
technology to the USSR. Among the primary targets of this campaign
are aerohydrodynamics, cryogenics, optics, lasers, computers, magnetic
bubble computer memories, microelectronics, structural and electronic
22
materials, and general nuclear developments.
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CONCLUSION

As this brief examination shows, intelligence has become a general
political tool rather than simply a military weapon. Gradually, its
objectives have changed: military concerns have merged into political
ones. The evolution of intelligence objectives was constant. Advances
in technology have sometimes masked the direction of this evolution
as fascination with intelligence techniques obscured the more
fundamental changes in the use of intelligence. The evolution of intelligence simply matches recognition of the relationship between politics
and war. War, it is often said, is merely an extension of politics. Thus,
intelligence objectives must ultimately be political ones because most
issues - economic, social, or technological - eventually translate them-
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selves into political concerns.
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The Dictionary of Essential Quotations by Kevin Goldstein-] ackson
(Croom Helm, Kent) £12.95.
A book of 'Essential' Quotations necessarily means that a subjective
choice has been made. This is no exception; from my own, albeit
selective dipping, Mr Goldstein-] ackson is cynic first, author second.
Few of his 'essential' quotations show pleasure.
Hence 'Joy' is missing altogether and 'Happiness' has rather sad
quotes like 'A lifetime of happiness; no man alive could bear it· it
would be hell on earth' (George Bernard Shaw) or even 'We are ne~er
happy, we can only remember we were so once' (Alexander Smith).
'Armies' has only three quotations - all by Mao Tse Tung. 'Honour'
has only three negative references while 'Courage' and 'Defence'
nothing at all. He cannot find one positive quotation about
'Democracy' .
However, there are some pithy and witty words of wisdom in this
book. The after-dinner speaker, may find inspiration.
1983.215 x 130711111. 184pp, 14pp index. Hardcover.
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